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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Kartchner v. State Tax Commission holds that a

judgment creditor cannot effect a lien against the property of
a judgment debtor's grantee.

This principle of law precludes

the Bank from obtaining a judgment lien against the property.
The undisputed facts show that the Dewsnups quitclaimed the
property to Lach on November 28, 1980.

The Bank docketed its

judgment against the Dewsnups on December 12, 1980.
2.

The well-established doctrine of equitable con-

version obviates the Bank's attempt to place a lien on the
property.

The judgment debtors and Lach entered into a binding

earnest money agreement on November 28, 1980.

At that point,

the judgment debtors held only bare legal title to the property
and thus no interest in the property to which a judgment lien
could attach.
3.

Respondent mistakenly argues that Appellants are

precluded from asserting that there is a factual dispute with
respect to the grant of summary judgment to Respondent.

In

granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment, the lower
court necessarily relied on facts that were speculative, certain to be controverted, and went beyond the record in the
case.

-1-

ARGUMENT
I.

KARTCHNER V, STATE TAX COMMISSION PROVIDES
RELIABLE PRECEDENT FOR A DETERMINATION
IN FAVOR OF APPELLANTS IN THIS CASE
Utah law is clear.

A judgment creditor cannot place a

lien against property of a judgment debtor's grantee.
v. State Tax Commission
(1956).

of Utah, 4 Utah

Kartchner

2d 382, 294 P.2d

790

It may be true that Kartchner presents an abbreviated

statement of the facts, but the simplicity of Kartchner reflects
the simplicity of the law with respect to this issue.
For example, Lund v. Donihue, 674 P.2d 107 (Utah 1983)
(per

curium),

which

relies

on

Kartchner

for

its denial

judgment lien, also involves a simple fact situation.

of a

In Lund, a

judgment creditor attempted to place a judgment lien against the
property of a husband after the husband conveyed his interest in
the property
their divorce.

to his wife

as part

of

the property division in

The property was deeded to the wife in 1971.

The

judgment creditor obtained a judgment against the husband in 1978
and docketed that judgment
recorded.

674 P.2d at 108.

in 1979.

The 1971 deed had not been

The court stated:

As to [the judgment creditor's] claim of
nonrecordation of deed from [the judgment
debtor] incident to the divorce as basis for
assertion of a lien. . . it is lacking in
substance.
The interest of [the judgment
debtor] was at best a naked paper title,
divested in the divorce action and awarded to
his wife to which [the judgment creditor's]
claimed lien could not have attached whether
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the divorce decree, including the order of
transfer or the deed, was recorded or not.
Such conclusion is made clear in Kartchner v.
State Tax Commission which is consonant with
the statement in Freeman's Treatise on Judgments to the effect that "whenever one holds
the naked legal title, having no beneficial
interest, there is nothing to which the
judgment lien can attach. . . ."
674 P.2d at 109 (footnotes omitted).

Thus, the material facts

necessary to preclude attachment of a judgment lien to property
are a conveyance by a judgment debtor to a grantee prior to the
docketing of a judgment against the judgment debtor.
The Kartchner and Lund decisions are consistent with
the doctrine of equitable conversion by which the interest of the
vendor of real property under an executory sales contract is
converted to naked legal title.
Appellants' brief and below.

See cases cited in Point II of

Whether the prior conveyance is by

contract or by deed, there is nothing to which a judgment lien
can attach.
Respondent expresses concern that the documents refer
to both Lach Family Partnership and Foothill Properties as the
buyer of the property.

The undisputed facts show that Foothill

Properties was not a different party in interest than Lach but
was a "dba" for appellant David Lachr a partner in the Lach Family Partnership.

The identity of the buyer is not material.

What is material is that the Dewsnups sold the property and no
longer had an interest to which a lien could attach.
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Respondent furthermore provides no basis, factually or
legally, for its claim that the conveyance to a dba invalidates
the conveyance.

See Barlow Society v, Commercial Security Bankr

39 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (filed July 31, 1986), in which the plaintiff questioned the structure of a transaction whereby a judgment
debtor conveyed an entire parcel to a grantee merely to facilitate financing and to secure an obligation on just the northern
portion of the land.

The court said the nature of the transac-

tion did not invalidate the conveyance:
the presumption

"If valid on its facer

is that the deed conveys fee title".

See also

Battistone v. American Land & Development Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah
1980).

In the present

conveyed fee title.
The

case, the presumption

is that the deed

There is no reason to conclude otherwise.

record

is

before

the

court.

Considering

the

undisputed facts and well-established Utah law, it is clear that
Lach owns the property free from any judgment

lien in favor of

the Bank*
II.

IN UTAH THE INTEREST OF A VENDOR IN REAL
PROPERTY SOLD IS NOT SUBJECT TO A JUDGMENT
LIEN.
Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the judg-

ment debtors had no interest

in the property to which any judg-

ment lien in favor of the Bank could attach.
enly states

that

Utah

cases dealing

stand for the proposition

with

Respondent mistak-

equitable

conversion

that the interest of a vendee
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in an

executory contract cannot be reached by a judgment creditor.
This is blatantly incorrect.

The Utah court has consistently

held to the contrary; the interest of a vendee can be reached by
a judgment creditor.
brief.

See cases cited in Point II of Appellants1

If the interest of a vendee in an executory contract can

be reached, a fortiori, the interest of a vendor in real property
is not subject to a judgment lien.
Once again, Respondent does not question the lav or the
undisputed facts of the case.

Instead, Respondent, without legal

or factual support, raises questions about price, possession, and
conditions.
As noted under Point II in Appellants' Brief, whether a
purchaser pays the full purchase price before the judgment is
docketed is immaterial under the doctrine of equitable conversion.

Respondent can cite no cases that point to the existence

of "partial" equitable conversion arising from partial payment of
the purchase price.

Once a binding agreement is reached and a

deed is transferred, ownership changes hands regardless of payment terms.
Moreover, it is not material to the ownership of the
property that the vendor retains possession subject to surrender
at a later date.

Illustrative of the point is Utah State Medical

Ass'n. v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643 (Utah
1982), where the Utah Supreme Court, relying on the principle of
equitable ownership, stated that a purchaser is entitled to any
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benefits that may accrue to the property and must also bear any
loss or depreciation to the property even when the vendor retains
possession,

655 P.2d at 644 (emphasis supplied) citing Jelco

Inc. v, Third Judicial District Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d
739 (1973).

The purchaser, therefore, as the holder of the

equitable interest in the property, is regarded as the owner of
the property.

Respondent cannot cite a case that suggests that

whether a lien attaches depends on who is in possession of the
property.
Respondent makes much of the fact that an addendum to
the earnest money agreement states that the contract is subject
to the parties reaching an agreement as to the solution of the
problems with drain fields, septic tank and water system.

This

was merely a term of the contract and one that would benefit
Lach.

In Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 1980), the lower

court granted a buyer specific performance of an earnest money
agreement despite the seller's protest that a septic tank permit
had not been obtained as required by the contract.
stated:
[T]he mere acquisition of a permit, as
required by the contract, was of no value to
[the seller]. The failure to obtain a permit
does not deprive [the seller] of any valuable
right. The provision was added to the contract by [the buyers], and the condition was
clearly for their benefit in putting the
property to its desired use. It was the [the
buyers] who were entitled to demand the benefit of that condition, and if they chose to
waive the condition, it was within their
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The court

power to do so. Ahrendt v. Bobbitt, 119 Utah
465, 229 P.2d 296 (1951).
615 P.2d
demand

at

430.

In the present

performance

provisions

do

not

of

the

affect

case, Lach was

foregoing
the

provisions.

validity

of

the

agreement, which is a legally binding contract
real property.

entitled

to

Thus,

those

earnest

money

for the sale of

Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597,

599 (1962).
Lastly, Respondent provides no factual or legaL support
for its assertion that Lach held merely an option to purchase the
real estate in question.
603
1884

(1884), does not
case

action

holds

that

Sweezy v. Jones,

65 Iowa 272, 21 N.W.

involve an earnest money agreement.
a

judgment

creditor

in equity to establish a judgment

cannot

maintain

The
an

lien upon land in the

possession of a judgment debtor under a lease with the right to
purchase

the

land.

It

is not

even remotely

issue before the Court in the present case.

connected

to the

The same is true of

Viqars v. Hewins, 184 Iowa 683, 169 N.W. 119 (1918).

The undis-

puted facts in the present case show that the judgment debtor and
Lach executed an earnest money agreement, not an option to purchase.
In short, the necessary elements of equitable conversion undisputedly

exist

in the case at bar.

There being no

interest on the part of the judgment debtor to which a lien could
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attach, Lach owns the property free from any judgment lien in
favor of the Bank.
III. RESPONDENT CANNOT SHOW THAT IT IS ENTITLED TO
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE
UNDISPUTED FACTS.
There is no factual basis for summary judgment in favor
of the Bank.

Respondent misunderstands Appellants' claim that

the lower court improperly granted Respondent summary judgment
because there were disputed issues of material fact with respect
to Respondent's motion.

Respondent states that if Appellants

claim there were undisputed facts for its motion, then those
undisputed facts necessarily support Respondent's motion.

That

is obviously not the case.
In reviewing a summary judgment, the Supreme Court will
view the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion and allow the summary judgment to stand only if the
movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the
undisputed facts.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Bushnell Real Estate

Inc. v. Nielsen, 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983).

In light of those

considerations, there is no question that Respondent's motion was
not supported by undisputed facts.

For example, there is no

evidence in the record that suggests that the transaction was
fraudulent to creditors.

Indeed, just the opposite is true. The

district court grant of summary judgment to Respondent should
therefore be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent does not provide any basis, factually or
legally, for an affirmation of the lower court's decisions below
and this Court should reverse the lower court and enter summary
judgment in favor of Appellants.
DATED this -?7# day of October, 1986.

JOHN B. WILSON
LOIS A. BAAR
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellants

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply
Brief to the following on this -? t^A day of October, 1986:
Heber Grant Ivins
75 North Center
American Fork, UT 84003
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